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Introduction 
Invasive alien species (IAS) - species that establish and spread in ecosystems to which they are 
not native  - are argued to be the second-most important cause of biodiversity loss worldwide 
(Holmes; U.S. EPA 2001).  Without natural predators, parasites, and/or pathogens to help control 
population growth, IAS frequently out-compete or prey on native species.  They cause or spread 
diseases to cultivated plants, livestock and human populations.  They often encroach on, damage or 
degrade assets (e.g., power plants, boats, piers, and reservoirs).  The associated economic 
impacts can be significant (Perrings et al. 2000).  
  IAS have had a significant impact on the Great Lakes.  At least 145 IAS have been introduced 
into the Great Lakes since the 1830's, with one-third being introduced during the past thirty years – 
likely in response to increased shipping in the St. Lawrence Seaway (ANS State Management 
Plan, 2001; GLC Resolutions, 2000).  Only about ten percent of introduced species have caused 
any damage (Mills et al. 1993) but, for those that have, the impacts are typically extensive (U.S. 
EPA 2001; MDEQ 2001; Coscarelli and Bankard 1999; Reeves 1999).  For example, zebra 
mussels alone are predicted to create five billion dollars in damages over the next ten years 
(MDEQ, 2000). 
Management of IAS includes several options: prevention of new species introductions 
(treating IAS as a form of ‘biological pollution”), eradication following introduction, containment 
or control of IAS populations (e.g., IPM), or adaptation.  Historically, efforts have focused on 
eradication and post-invasion control, with comparatively little effort being committed to 
preventive measures.  But that is changing, possibly due to the recognition that most new IAS 
introductions are the result of human activities.  In the Great Lakes, commercial shipping has been 
implicated in over 60% of new introductions since 1960 (Mills et al. 1993), with ballast water   2
being the primary pathway.
1  Ships carry water in their hulls as ballast to maintain stability and 
integrity.  Species may be inadvertently transferred into or out of a ship as ballast water levels are 
adjusted at port to account for changes in cargo, or in transit to improve stability or to alter hull 
depth.   
Oceanic ballast water exchange has been the predominant preventive approach to IAS in the 
Great Lakes, becoming mandatory in 1993 with the implementation of the U.S. Nonindigenous 
Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of 1990, and later by the U.S. National Invasive 
Species Act of 1996 and the Canadian Shipping Act of 1998 (Reeves 1999).
2  All vessels entering 
the Great Lakes with ballast on board (BOB) are required to exchange ballast at sea beyond the 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in a depth of at least 2,000m, so that ballast salinity levels are 
raised to 30ppt (ocean salinity levels range between 34 to 36ppt).  This ballast must then be 
retained for the duration of the voyage into the Great Lakes (NRC 1996).  Ballast retention is the 
primary prevention measure, while oceanic exchange is secondary.  For instance, if some ballast 
exchange was to take place in the Great Lakes, e.g. to pass through a lock or for safety reasons, it 
is thought that organisms that might survive in the fresh or brackish waters of the Great Lakes could 
not survive in the high saline levels that would result from the oceanic exchange, and vice versa 
(Rigby and Taylor 2001).
3   
                                                             
1 Solid ballast and hull-fouling were once important causes of introductions.  But solid ballast is now seldom used, 
and steel hulls combined with anti-fouling techniques have greatly diminished introductions due to hull-fouling. 
2 In 2001, the State of Michigan enacted Public Act 114 that requires reporting of ballast management and ties 
eligibility for state grants, awards, and loans to satisfactory ballast management. 
3 The primary purpose of increasing salinity levels in the tanks is not necessarily to kill freshwater organisms in 
the tanks, although this is a secondary effect.  Rather, the intent is a 100% exchange of water and organisms, as it 
is felt that oceanic organisms that could survive in the Great Lakes would have already migrated there long ago.  
Hence, oceanic ballast exchange represents an exchange of organisms across two distinct ecological zones by 
which reciprocal introductions do not occur (Reeves 1999).   3
The success of oceanic exchange programs is unclear because new introductions have 
occurred since 1993 and there are known limitations to the practice of ballast water exchange.  
First, a vessel does not have to conduct an oceanic exchange if this is deemed to be unsafe.  Hull 
stress increases and stability decreases during an oceanic exchange (Reeves 1999), and it is not 
uncommon for captains to opt out of an exchange due to safety reasons.
4  Second, ballast exchange 
typically does not result in a 100 percent replacement of all ballast water and sludge (Rigby and 
Taylor 2001; Reeves 1999).  Many organisms are left in the tanks and the high salinity levels do 
not kill them all (Rigby and Taylor 2001; Reeves 1999).  A third limitation is that the regulations 
do not apply to vessels entering the Great Lakes with no ballast on board (NOBOB), which 
typically carry tons of unpumpable sludge at the bottom of their hulls.  This sludge may be home to 
many foreign organisms that can be introduced when the ship initially takes on ballast at its first 
stop in the G reat Lakes, and/or when it exchanges ballast at subsequent ports.  Farley (1996) 
estimates that ships entering the Great Lakes with a NOBOB status accounted for 84% of the 
discharged ballast containing foreign water in 1995. 
The limitations of current regulatory approaches are now generally recognized, as is the need 
for new policy options that promote both safety and cost-effectiveness (NRC 1996; Rigby and 
Taylor 2001).  A number of technological alternatives to ballast exchange currently exist, but the 
cost-effectiveness of each is thought to vary widely across vessels due to heterogeneities in vessel 
characteristics (Rigby and Taylor 2001).  This implies that uniform technology standards would be 
inefficient, and that performance-based approaches that allow each vessel to make individualized 
choices make more economic sense. 
Pollution trading is a performance-based approach that is gaining increasing acceptance as an 
efficient means for achieving emissions reductions, and trading has successfully reduced the costs 
                                                             
4 In 1998, the Flare broke in half on its way to Montreal, and ballast exchange may have contributed to this.   4
of controlling various forms of air and water pollution in the U.S. and other developed countries 
(see e.g., Baumol and Oates 1988; Hahn 1989; Hanley et al. 1997; Tietenberg 1995).  Could an 
IAS tradeable permit program offer similar economic gains?  The answer depends on how well 
the program is designed to realize the potential gains.   
Two features of  vessels’ biological emissions complicate matters.  First, not every vessel 
will actually emit a species, yet ex ante each vessel is a potential emitter and so society is 
expected to benefit from all vessels undertaking biosecurity actions to reduce the probability of an 
invasion.  Second, biological emissions are highly stochastic and essentially unobservable given 
current monitoring technologies – much like nonpoint source pollution (Shortle and Dunn 1986).  
So there is no way to directly observe or otherwise indirectly measure if a vessel is responsible 
for an introduction. 
Because there is no readily available method of directly measuring IAS emissions, they cannot 
be directly traded.   This is in contrast to conventional pollution permit programs, in which 
pollution permits define allowable emissions for the permit holder.  In consequence, a fundamental 
issue in the design of IAS trading programs is what exactly it is that vessels will trade.  One option 
is a performance proxy – estimates of emissions, where the estimates are derived from a model 
that relates vessel characteristics and observable biosecurity investments to emissions estimates.
5  
In m ost cases, an emissions estimate is more accurately described as the probability of a species 
introduction by the vessel. 
  We examine the design and efficiency of a tradeable permit system for IAS biological 
pollution.  We begin by developing a model of IAS invasions.  Next, we derive the features of a 
first-best allocation of biosecurity efforts and show that a permit system based on a risk proxy 
                                                             
5 Another option would be observable biosecurity (input) choices by the vessel, which has been suggested for a 
basis for tradeable permit markets involving nonpoint sources (Shortle and Abler 1997; Hanley et al. 1997).   5
cannot be first-best.  We then illustrate the features of a second-best market.  This is followed by 
an application to shipping in the Great Lakes, where we compare the cost-effectiveness of trading 
versus command and control.  The final section concludes and offers recommendations. 
 
A model of IAS invasions 
The model we adopt builds on that of Horan et al. (2002).  Each vessel entering the Great Lakes is 
considered to be a potential carrier or vector of biological pollution.  Individual vessels make a 
variety of biosecurity choices affecting the likelihood of species introductions.  In the case of 
commercial shipping these choices might include the effort involved with ballast water exchange, 
the number and location of stops, the time at sea, and the use of biocides, filtering, and heat.  The 
ith vessel’s choices are denoted by the (1·m) input vector xi (with jth element xij).  Many inputs 
will be “lumpy” investments, although we consider them to be continuous for now.  Biological 
pollution control costs are a function of the vessel’s biosecurity choices, ci(xi). 
The biomass of species s (s=1,...,S) introduced in the given habitat by firm i is denoted eis.  A 
firm cannot control eis with certainty.  Introductions are random due to the influence of stochastic 
variables that are not directly under the firm’s control (e.g., environmental drivers), although the 
probability of a particular level of biomass emissions is conditional on the firm’s biosecurity 
choices.  The probability that  eis is introduced, conditional on input choices and firm 
characteristics (bi) is pis(eis| xi, bi). 
  A species that is introduced may or may not establish and spread (invade), and cause 
ecological and economic damages.  Conditions, including the in situ control regime (which we 
take here as given), must be right for a successful invasion.  We assume damages only occur from a 
successful invasion.  Such an outcome occurs with some probability, conditional on the scale of   6
the introduction and also location and habitat characteristics (e.g., predators and food sources), 
denoted by  l.  The probability that an introduction eis leads to a successful invasion is denoted 
) , , | ( Pr l x e survival i is s , and is increasing in  is e .  A firm’s biosecurity choices also influence this 
probability to the extent that they influence the quality of an introduction.  For instance, a species 
may be introduced in either a healthy or a weakened state, with the state of health being directly 
influenced by a firm’s biosecurity choices.  Accordingly, for discrete levels of eis, the probability 
that introductions of species  s by firm  i lead to an invasion is 
￿ =
is e
i i is is i is s i i is b x e p l x e survival w b x q ) , | ( ) , , | ( Pr ) , , ( .  This specification assumes that invasions 
arise via particular firms and that the probability of an invasion via one firm is independent of 
introductions by other firms.  This may be a simplification for some cases in which the alien 
population depends on a large number of introductions to become established in the new habitat.  
But it is realistic for species that are fairly well-suited to the new ecosystem and can establish 
with only small numbers (e.g., invasive pathogens). 
Because a species is able to proliferate in situ once it has invaded, we assume a species can 
only invade once and that the marginal damages of further invasions of the same species is zero. 
This is in contrast to many pollution problems in which the current level of emissions matters.  It is 
analogous to pollution problems in which the marginal damage cost of pollution falls to zero once 
the assimilative capacity of the environment has been exceeded.  A species invasion is a Bernoulli 
event: an invasion either occurs or it does not occur.  The probability of an invasion of species s 
via any one of n firms is 
(1)   )) , , ( 1 ( 1 ) 0 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) ,..., (
1
1 l b x q Z P Z P x x P i i is
n
i
s s s n s - P - = = - = ‡ =
=  
where Zs represents the number of times that species s invades a given ecosystem.  The probability   7
Ps is  decreasing in biosecurity measures that make introductions less likely and increasing in 
biosecurity measures that make introductions more likely.  The probability Ps is also increasing in 
the number of firms.  As nﬁ¥, invasion becomes a virtual certainty (i.e., Psﬁ1).  This is because 
IAS control in this model depends on the least effective provider, representing a 'weakest link' 
public good (Perrings et al., 2002).  
The (present value of) economic damages due to an invasion by the sth species are  ) ( s s D g , 
where gs is a random variable reflecting uncertain damage costs.
6  At least some of the random 
factors influencing the probability of survival may also influence damages.  For instance, 
stochastic environmental variables that affect the probability that an introduced species will 
establish and spread may also influence its impact on the ecological services provided by the host 
system. Denote the common (sub-) set of random variables influencing both survival and damages 
by qs, and define the probability of survival, conditional on the value of qs, by  ) | ,..., ( 1 s n s x x P q .  







s n s s n x x P D E x x D E
1
1 1 )} | ,..., ( { )} ,..., ( { q  
Ex ante efficient (first-best) management of biological pollution 
Ex ante efficient biosecurity measures minimize the expected social cost of biological pollution 
and its control
7 
                                                             
6 The management response to the invasion is taken as given here, although a more complete model would consider 
the tradeoffs between prevention and mitigation efforts.   
7 Perrings et al. (2000) point out that the probabilities of invasion may be quite small and the associated damages 
quite large, which may give rise to non-convexities.  Moreover, managers might not make decisions according to 
expected utility theory in such instances, instead making decisions based on a reference point.  Shackle’s (1969) 
theory of decision-making under uncertainty (ignorance) is consistent with a reference point approach, and Horan 
et al. (2002) illustrate that making decisions in this fashion can be equivalent to using the expected utility model 
with subjective weights applied to the reference point.    8
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The necessary conditions for an interior solution can be written as 






























Condition (4) states that the marginal cost of undertaking a particular action (the left hand side 
(LHS)) optimally equals the marginal expected benefits (i.e., the reduction in damages) of the 
action (the right hand side (RHS)).  The marginal expected benefits include both mean (the first 
RHS term) and risk (the second RHS term) impacts.  The risk impacts occur because the specific 
choices made by each firm have uncertain effects on the likelihood of adverse environmental 
outcomes (e.g., see Shortle and Dunn 1986).  The covariance term vanishes if  ˛ s q ˘.  Further 
interpretations of (4) are provided by Horan et al. (2002).  
A Model of Trading 
Consider a tradeable permit system where permits are denominated in terms of the likelihood or 
probability of an IAS introduction  is p , or the probability of an invasion  is q .  Both of these 
probabilities are ex ante measures of environmental performance, although  is q more closely relates 
a vessel’s biosecurity choices to environmental damages when some choices affect  is q  directly 
(Turvey 1963).  We therefore consider  is q as the relevant permit base to consider.  Since  is q is a 
performance-based measure, vessels attempting to achieve a particular level of  is q are given the 
flexibility to reduce their expected environmental pressures in the most cost-effective way, which 
also reduces the expected social costs of control.   
A probability-based, or risk-based, permit system would be somewhat analogous to existing 
point-nonpoint trading systems designed to incorporate nonpoint sources of pollution, such as   9
agriculture, into water quality improvement programs.   Permits for these programs are 
denominated in terms of expected (as opposed to actual) emissions (Horan 2001; Malik et al., 
1993; Horan et al. 2002), which are calculated by a model that links on-site management practices 
and farm characteristics with expected changes in water quality.
8  In the case of IAS pollution, 
models could be developed to estimate the probability of an invasion,  is q , based on firm 
characteristics and management practices.  This is an emerging area, with many researchers trying 
to identify species that are candidates for invasion and the likelihood of such invasions (Ricciardi 
and Rasmussen 1998; Peterson and Vieglais 2001). 
A tradeable permit market works by providing each vessel with risk permits for each 
potential invader, denoted  0 is r , and allowing vessels to trade the permits among themselves.  The 
only requirement is that the level of risk actually generated by each vessel must not exceed the 
vessel’s permit holdings.  Denote the market-clearing price of the risk permits by  r u .  Vessels will 
choose biosecurity measures and risk permit holdings,  is r , to minimize costs, 
 (5)  
is is
s
is is s i i r x
r q t s
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) ( ) (      0 ,  
Assuming the constraint can be satisfied as an equality, vessel i’s problem can be written as 
(6)    ￿ - +
s
is n is s i i x r x x q u x c Min
i
) ) ,..., ( ( ) (      0 1  
The resulting first order conditions are 
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8 Examples of agricultural nonpoint pollution models abound, including the Erosion Productivity Impact Calculator 
(EPIC), the Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT), the Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Model 
(AGNPS), the Hydrologic Simulation Program –Fotran (HSPF), and the Generalized Watershed Loading Function 
(GWLF).   10





is r q 0   "s.  Comparison of condition (7) with condition (4) indicates that the market 
solution will only be efficient if the market clears at the following set of permits prices 
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where the starred (*) terms on the right-hand-side (RHS) of (8) indicate that these relations are 
evaluated at their optimal levels.  Condition (8) represents a series of  n·m equations in  S 
unknowns.  If n·m>S, then the system is overdetermined: a solution will not exist and the market 
cannot be efficient (see Shortle and Dunn 1986 for an analogous result in the context of reducing 
estimated nonpoint emissions).  If n·m<S, then the efficient outcome can be attained. 
  To see why the market may be inefficient, even when the total number of permits is set 
optimally, consider the following condition which is sufficient for satisfying (8) 
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Using (1), condition (9) can be written as 
(10)  
ij is
ij s s i
s s s x q
x P D






} / , cov{
)} 1 {( } {
* *
* *   "s,i,j 
where  )) | ( 1 ( 1 s ks
i k
i
s q P q • - P - =
„
-  is the aggregate probability (conditional on  s q ) that species s 
will invade from any vessel other than vessel i.  The two terms on the RHS of (10), respectively, 
reflect the mean effects of a vessel’s reduction in the probability of an invasion, and the risk-
effects associated with a vessel’s input use.  The market-clearing price is overdetermined in 
condition (10) for two reasons. First, the mean marginal impact of a vessel’s efforts to reduce the 
probability of an invasion,  )} 1 {(
* i
s P E
- - , differs for each vessel.  Vessel-specific probabilities of   11
invasion are not perfect substitutes for one another.  It is therefore not efficient for vessels to be 
trading permits on a one-for-one basis.  This result is consistent with those of traditional pollution 
permit trading markets, where it is well-known that 1:1 trades are inefficient when firms’ 
emissions have differential marginal environmental impacts (McGartland and Oates, 1985; 
Montgomery, 1972; Tietenberg, 1995a).  It would be more efficient if trades were evaluated on a 
trade-specific basis.  Of course, this would increase the transactions costs of trading, ultimately 
leading to fewer trades and larger program costs. 
The second reason equation (14) is overdetermined is the covariance term.  This term 
represents the risk-effects of choosing biosecurity measures to control the probability of an 
invasion as opposed to expected damages.  The problem is that when firms make choices to reduce 
the probability of an invasion, there may be unintended impacts on damages since the firm has no 
incentives to account for these.  Therefore, a trading program based on the probability of an 
invasion cannot satisfy (5) cost-effectively when  ˇ s q ˘ because it does not provide firms with 
incentives to consider all of the impacts of their choices on damages. 
A first-best trading program (i.e., one that satisfies (5) cost-effectively) when  ˇ s q ˘ would 
involve firms trading permits (or requirements) based on biosecurity investments (Shortle and 
Abler 1997).  Such a program could be designed to provide firms with the correct incentives to 
consider the impacts of their choices on damages.  But such a program would require the use of 
m·S separate permits being traded at  n·m·S  rates.  This would clearly be administratively 
complex if not infeasible.  Moreover, in practice many of the biosecurity choices are ‘lumpy’ 
investments that are not easily tradeable.  Because of these difficulties we now turn to a simpler, 
second-best trading program.   12
Second-best management 
Consider a market is which trades between vessels can only take place on a 1:1 basis, and 
there is only one type of permit: a permit restricting the probability that a vessel introduces any 
species,  ) , , ( l b x q i i i .  The restriction of 1:1 trading is analogous to some existing trading systems in 
other arenas, but as described above it also implies certain inefficiencies due to the fact that each 
vessel has a different marginal environmental impact.  Even if each vessel had identical marginal 
environmental impacts, such a trading scheme could only be second-best due to the covariance 
effects described above.  The restriction of a single permit reduces efficiency when introductions 
of different species have different damage impacts, but such a system is easier to manage.  
Moreover, in practice it may not be possible to identify all possible invaders and also the 
likelihood of invasion ex ante (Horan et al. 2002), and so this permit system may reduce 
information requirements on the part of both vessels and the administrator. 
  Another complexity to deal with is the reality that the complete state space and associated 
probabilities, for both potential invaders and potential damages from known and unknown 
potential invaders, cannot be identified ex ante.  Accordingly, the ex ante efficient problem (3) is 
not well-defined.  A reasonable alternative is to pursue a cost-effective allocation of biosecurity 
controls based on probabilistic information that can be developed subjectively.   
  Cost-effectiveness is a standard benchmark for analyzing pollution control resource 
allocations.  Useful notions of cost-effectiveness for biological pollution control must consider the 
unobservable and stochastic nature of species introductions, and the stochastic nature of invasions.  
Since damages are presently unknown and perhaps unknowable for many species, a useful 
approach to defining the least-cost allocation uses probabilistic constraints of the form 
(11)   s n s x x P F £ ) ,..., ( 1     S s ˆ ˛ "    13
where 0£Fs£1 and  S ˆ  (with  S S ˝ ˆ ) represents a set of target species upon which controls are 
based.
9  This “safety-first” approach, which has received attention in economic research on the 
control of stochastic pollution (Beavis and Walker 1983; Lichtenberg and Zilberman 1988; 
Lichtenberg et al. 1989), is consistent with the goals of the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO).  The IMO has accepted that reducing risk (and not trying to eliminate it) should form the 
basis for the development of new mandatory ballast water management instruments (Rigby and 
Taylor 2001).
10  The focus on target species is an approach that has been formally adopted by the 
Australian Ballast Water Management Council, and it is considered to be a de facto approach in 
ballast water management programs in the Great Lakes (although some might argue that the Great 
Lakes approach is non-target oriented) (Rigby and Taylor 2001).  
                                                             
9 When damages are known, an interesting cost-effectiveness concept when invasions are stochastic is an 
upper bound on expected damage costs  T x x D E n £ )} ,..., ( { 1 , where T is the upper bound.  Unless  ˛ s q ˘ (i.e., 
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1 ) ,..., ( } { } { ), then only in this case will allocations that achieve the 
target at least cost be unambiguously more efficient than allocations that achieve the target at higher cost (Shortle 
1990; Horan 2001). 
10 Technically, the IMO is promoting the use of the precautionary principle of minimizing risk (Rigby and Taylor 
2001).  However, it also realizes that risk cannot be completely eliminated, suggesting that it understands the costs 
of attaining such an objective would be too high.  Our focus on a safety-first criterion therefore appears to be 
consistent with their objectives.   14
  An ex ante cost-effective allocation of biosecurity measures minimizes the expected cost of 
biological pollution control (TC) subject to (11) and also subject to vessel responses to the permit 
system.  There are two ways to determine the number of permits that minimize TC, subject to (11) 
and vessel responses.  A primal approach would be to choose the optimal number of total permits, 
￿ =
i
i r R 0  and distribute the permits according to some rule.
11  In contrast, a dual approach is to 
take as given the vessels’ input demand functions that result from the vessels’ first order 
conditions,  ) (u xi , where u is the equilibrium permit price, and choose permit prices optimally.  
Specifically, the objective function for the dual approach is
12 
(12) 
S ˆ s        )) ( ),..., ( (     s.t.
      )) ( (    
1
1
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The first order conditions for this problem are 
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along with the constraint (11), where  s l  is the shadow value of the sth constraint.  Using the 
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i j
ij u x u x
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* * * k , and the superscript (*) indicates that all variables are 
                                                             
11 Options range from public auctions to free-of-charge assignments.  See Hanley et al. (1997) for discussion of 
options and issues. 
12 If the permit system is not denominated according to different species (which would be difficult to administer if 
the number of target species was large) then in the cost-effective solution it will not be possible to satisfy each 
constraint in (11) as an equality.   15
evaluated at their optimal values as the solution to (12).   
Interpreting 
*
ij k  as a weight (since  1
* = ￿￿
i j
ij k ), the numerator of the expression for u is the 
marginal social cost of biosecurity controls, averaged across all species, vessels and biosecurity 
choices.  The denominator is the marginal impact of bioscurity controls on the likelihood of 
invasion, averaged across all vessels and biosecurity choices.  The averaging of impacts across 
all species, vessels and biosecurity choices in equation (14) is a consequence of the restrictions of 
1:1 trading across vessels.  Another inefficiency is implied by the focus on all species as opposed 
to individual species.  In consequence, the second-best price u does not give firms incentives to 
exploit differences in their relative marginal environmental impacts as a differentiated price 
system would.  The degree to which this creates inefficiencies depends on the degree of 
heterogeneity of marginal impacts and on correlations between key environmental and cost 
relationships. 
An application to Great Lakes shipping 
  Each year, approximately 200 – 300 vessels enter the Great Lakes and account for 400-600 
round trips in and out of the region.  More than 70 percent of entering vessels are of international 
flag and are engaged in the ‘triangle trade’, taking grain from the Great Lakes to the Mediterranean, 
and then to Northern Europe (Reeves 1999).  Major overseas markets are Western Europe, the 
Baltics, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East.  A number of other vessels, known as “lakers”, 
operate exclusively on the Great Lakes.  While lakers may be responsible for spreading IAS 
within the Great Lakes, they are not responsible for new introductions into the region.  Our focus is 
on vessels that pose a threat of new introductions. 
  Vessel heterogeneity is defined according to each vessel’s deadweight tonnage (DWT).  
Magma (2003) provides unofficial statistics on all international vessels that travel up and down   16
the St. Lawrence Seaway.  We focus on a subset of 305 international vessels, which represents the 
majority of Seaway vessels.  According to Reeves (1999), vessels carry 15 – 30% of DWT in 
ballast water.  We use 30% of DWT as the value of ballast water capacity, denoted  i b  for the ith 
vessel, although we do not assume each vessel enters the Seaway carrying that much ballast.  
Rather, this value represents each vessel’s potential ballast – it may enter or leave the Seaway 
with this much ballast or a fraction thereof.  Because a tank can never be fully emptied (i.e., 
0 > i b ), this value also accounts for the unpumpable sludge in a vessel’s tanks, which is 
particularly relevant for the majority of entering vessels that bear the NOBOB status (Reeves 
1999).   
  The concept of target species has not been adopted in the Great Lakes as it has been in 
Australia (Rigby and Taylor 2001), but some potential invaders of concern have been identified, 
particularly from the Ponto-Caspian region which supplied approximately 70 percent of Great 
Lakes invaders between 1985 and 2000 (Reid and Orlova 2002).  Ricciardi and Rasmussen 
(1998) identify the Ponto-Caspian species Corophium spp. (a small amphipod), Mysids (a small 
shrimp), and Clupeonella caspia (a small fish) as likely invaders capable of causing extensive 
damage.  
The base probability that a vessel i will transport species s into the Great Lakes, for the case 
where the vessel adopts no biosecurity measures, is denoted  is k .  This value is directly 
proportional to the ballast (or sludge) that the vessel carries,  i is is b k a = , where  is a >0 is a 
parameter:  larger vessels are more likely to bring in species, ceteris paribus.  In general,  is a may 
vary according to the vessel’s trade route.  But with most vessels following the triangle trade route 
and without detailed information on ports visited and the risks associated with specific ports, we 
assume this value is the same for all vessels.  Assuming species  s is introduced into the   17
environment, the likelihood that the species will establish is denoted  s b .  In the absence of 
biosecurity efforts,  i is s b a b  represents the likelihood of an invasion of species s by vessel i. 
Vessels can adopt various biosecurity techniques to reduce the probability of an invasion.  
Filtering reduces the likelihood that species will enter or exit a vessel’s ballast tanks.  The 
effectiveness of filtering on species s is denoted by the function  ) ( if fs x f  (with  ] 1 , 0 [ ˛ if x  and 
L
fs fs fs f f f = = ) 1 ( , 1 ) 0 ( , where 
L
fs f  is a lower bound on  fs f ), with  if x  being an index that represents 
the effectiveness of the filtering technology, e.g., by choice of mesh size for the filter. 
  The survival of species in transit is affected by in-transit ballast management practices.  The 
most promising in-transit practices are ballast exchange via continuous flushing, reballasting, heat, 
chemical treatments, and ultraviolet radiation (UV) (Rigby and Taylor 2001; Pollutech 1996).  
Reballasting is often considered dangerous, whereas ballast exchange via continuous flushing has 
been shown to be safer and as effective (Rigby and Taylor 2001).  Chemical treatments are usually 
discouraged due to their high cost and also the safety and environmental hazards associated with 
their use (NRC 1996; Rigby and Taylor 2001; Pollutech 1996).  UV is only considered to be 
potentially effective when it is combined with a filtering technology, but even then experts 
disagree as to its potential (NRC 1996).  We therefore only consider ballast exchange via 
continuous flushing (henceforth, ballast exchange) and heat as possible in-transit practices, which 
Perakis and Yang (2001) also suggests are the most promising practices (along with filtering) for 
the Great Lakes situation.   
The effectiveness of each practice will vary depending on the effort allocated to their use.  
For instance, the amount of ballast exchange depends on the duration of the exchange.  Heat must 
be applied at a high enough temperature for a long enough period of time to kill everything, and 
this can be difficult and costly to achieve (Rigby and Taylor 2001; Pollutech 1996; NRC 1996).    18
As above, define the effectiveness of practice  j on species s by  ) ( ij js x f  (with  ] 1 , 0 [ ˛ ij x  and 
U
js js js f f f = = ) 1 ( , 0 ) 0 ( , where 
U
js f is an upper bound on  js f ).
13   
Given this specification, the probability that species s invades due to the activities of vessel i 
is given by  is if fs ih hs iB Bs s is k x x x q )] ( 1 )][ ( 1 )][ ( 1 [ f f f b - - - = , where the indices B and h represent 
ballast exchange and heat, respectively.  The function 
js
ij ij ij js x x
d m f = ) (  (j=f,B,h), where  ij m  and 
js d are parameters that are calibrated from reported results of the effectiveness of the various 
ballast water management practices, under the assumption that  1 = ij x  in the experiments that 
generated the effectiveness data (Rigby and Taylor 2001; see Table 1). 
  Vessel i’s variable control costs are defined by  ￿ =
j
ij ij i i x w x c ) ( , where  ij w  is the constant 
per unit cost of practice j for vessel i.  Unit costs vary by ballast capacity (Rigby and Taylor 
2001).  Using Rigby and Taylor’s cost data for cape size and container vessels (Table 2), we 
calibrate unit costs by vessel size, 
ij
i ij ij b w
r g = .  There is also a fixed capital cost associated with 
the use of some technologies.  Fixed costs (Table 2) also depend on vessel size, 
ij
i ij ij b F
R G = .
14   
With multiple technologies and associated fixed costs, determining optimal allocations of 
control efforts requires that we solve a constrained, mixed-integer nonlinear programming 
(MINLP) problem.  There are many ways to solve such problems, with a brute force approach 
being to determine an optimum for each possible combination of technology adoption choices 
across vessels and then comparing these optima to find the global optimum.  Fortunately, many 
                                                             
13 It is necessary for the regulatory agency to have perfect knowledge of each vessel’s effort levels in order to 
accurately gauge whether the vessel is in compliance with its permit holdings.  We assume that it is possible to 
perfectly monitor effort levels, although in reality vessels will have incentives to mis-represent their actual effort 
levels. 
14 After deriving fixed costs, they are annualized using a rate of 8% over a 15-year interval to obtain the results in 
Table 2.    19
permutations can easily be eliminated from consideration.  First, we have found through 
experimentation that it is never optimal for a single vessel to adopt two technologies.  Second, 
many permutations can be eliminated by noticing that effort costs and effectiveness are perfectly 
correlated with vessel size.  For instance, consider the case with only two technologies, ballast 
exchange and filtering.  A baseline scenario might involve all vessels adopting ballast exchange.  
This technology has the greatest unit cost and is also the least effective of the two technologies, but 
might be a first choice for adoption because it also has the smallest fixed costs.  The next scenario 
to consider would be the same as the baseline except that the largest vessel adopts filtering (with 
the smallest unit cost and greatest effectiveness, but also the largest fixed costs), which would 
have the greatest impacts on reducing both risk and costs.  In the next permutation, the largest two 
vessels might adopt filtering, and so on.  What simplifies things is that it is never optimal for a 
smaller vessel to adopt filtering while a larger vessel adopts ballast exchange – this would only 
increase costs and reduce effectiveness.
15  So such permutations (the bulk of possibilities) are 
ruled out.  This enables us to solve and compare results from a small subset of permutations.  
Results 
Simulation results for several values of  s F  are reported in Table 3 for the least cost outcome 
(which is the same as a highly complex first-best trading program), the permit trading market, and 
various uniform technological regulations.  The parameter  s b  is set equal to 0.1 "s in accordance 
with the observation by Perrings et al. (2002) that introduced species often have about a ten 
percent chance of establishing a viable population in the new ecosystem.  The parameter  s a is set 
equal to  000001 . 0  "s to complete the model specification and ensure that each species has a 
moderate chance of invasion in any particular year when there are no policies or controls in place.  
                                                             
15 Of course, fixed costs also matter and in theory could affect this result, but random experiments support this   20
Specifically, each species has a 28% chance of invasion in any given year in the unregulated base 
case.  Note that although  s a  and  s b  are the same for each vessel,  is q varies considerably by vessel 
since this value also depends on the vessel’s size. Several patterns emerge from Table 3.  First, 
consider the choice of technologies under the two optimally determined plans (least cost and 
trading).  Heating is never a preferred option for any of the scenarios due to its high unit costs, 
which imply high overall costs when the desired level of risk is low (e.g., see the costs associated 
with a uniform heating requirement at even the F=0.1 level of risk).  Second, ballast exchange is 
optimally used more extensively for larger allowable risk levels, as evidenced by their proportion 
in total control costs.  As the overall level of risk ( F) is reduced, the effort required for an 
effective ballast transfer becomes so high that it becomes optimal for some vessels to incur the 
fixed costs of filtering to take advantage of its low unit cost and high degree of effectiveness.   
The second observation that can be made from Table 3 is that heterogeneity in risk across 
vessels is optimal even though IAS control is a weakest-link public good.  This heterogeneity, 
measured by the coefficient of variation of the likelihoods that vessels will create an invasion of 
Corophium spp., arises to take advantage of differences in marginal costs across vessels and, in 
the least cost allocation, differences in vessels’ marginal impacts on overall risk.  Perhaps 
surprising is that there is greater dispersion of risk across vessels for smaller values of F.  In 
order to achieve more stringent goals, more small vessels optimally increase their control efforts 
until their effort approaches an upper bound.  The result is a bimodal distribution of effort, with 
larger vessels maintaining lower levels of effort, and greater heterogeneity in risk across vessels.  
One would expect that this bimodal distribution again becomes modal and risk heterogeneity 
reduced as Fﬁ0.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
assumption.    21
A third observation from Table 3 is that the trading system performs at different levels under 
different levels of overall risk.  When F=0.1, control costs are 30 percent larger under trading 
than in the least cost allocation, while there is only a s ix percent difference when  F=0.01.  
Trading results in higher costs primarily because vessel-specific risk is traded on a one-for-one 
basis, so that vessels have no incentives to consider the marginal impacts of their risk on the 
aggregate likelihood of an invasion.  Large vessels have more incentive to buy permits and 
increase their risk relative to smaller vessels, but the larger vessels also have the greatest marginal 
impact on the aggregate level of risk.  These incentives therefore reduce the cost-effectiveness of 
the resulting allocation of controls.  With the second-best risk permits, that vessels do not consider 
their individual marginal impacts on aggregate risk can be seen indirectly by noting that there is 
less risk heterogeneity under trading than in the least cost solution.  The only reason for this 
difference is that some vessels do not take advantage of the greater marginal impacts of their effort 
on risk reduction, which would tend to increase heterogeneity.  The inefficiencies of trading are 
diminished as F becomes smaller.  The reason is that there are fewer technological/behavioral 
options as F is reduced – even in the least cost outcome more and more vessels must operate with 
maximum effort when more stringent goals must be satisfied, leaving less room to exploit vessel-
specific differences that could otherwise lead to increased cost savings.  Consequently, the least 
cost and trading allocations become more similar when the aggregate risk goal is lowered. 
Finally, consider the results of a uniform technological requirement designed to achieve the 
desired level of risk.  Uniform ballast exchange requirements are less costly than the uniform 
filtering or heat requirements when the overall level of risk remains high due to their low fixed 
costs.  But uniform filtering requirements dominate at more stringent risk levels, as the much lower 
unit costs of filtering make up for its larger fixed costs when effort levels are greater.  Heat is   22
never a cost-effective option due to its high unit cost, which is consistent with the views of 
Pollutech (1996).  Trading always dominates the uniform treatment requirements, although the cost 
differences greatly diminish as overall risk is reduced.  Trading results in 25 percent lower costs 
than uniform ballast exchange requirements when F=0.1, but it is only 1.6 percent more efficient 
than uniform filtering requirements when F=0.01.  The reasons are the same as they were when 
describing differences between the least cost and trading options – vessels must undertake more 
uniform actions as the stringency of the environmental goal is increased.   
 
Conclusion  
Although emissions cannot be measured or controlled with certainty and not every vessel will 
actually emit a species, market-based approaches involving tradable permits could be adapted to 
IAS problems.  Such a program would involve trades in probabilities of invasion rather than 
trades in actual outcomes.  Even though risk-based permits are likely to have high transaction 
costs, they offer the potential to achieve risk reductions at lower cost than uniform technology 
standards.  A model of Great Lakes shipping was developed to evaluated the potential gains that 
risk-based trading might offer relative to uniform technology regulations for ballast water control. 
The simulation results suggest that trading has potential to outperform uniform technology 
requirements, though the efficiency gains from trading depend on the permitted level of aggregate 
invasion risk.  At less stringent target levels for aggregate invasion risks, i.e., at higher 
probabilities of invasion in any year, cost savings for trading do emerge.  The cost savings stem 
from the heterogeneity in invasion risks and biosecurity cost structures associated with alternative 
vessel classes.  If vessels are g iven flexibility to exploit these differences, the decentralized 
trading of vessel-specific risk permits allows the aggregate risk target to be achieved at lower   23
total cost.  However, at more stringent levels, the responses of vessels are limited and potential 
cost savings from trading are smallest.  For these lower risk levels, most vessels adopt filtering in 
the least cost solution.  When it is efficient for a large share of the vessels to use the control same 
technology, the gains from trading will be small.  Thus, despite the heterogeneity of vessels, the 
findings suggest that a uniform technology can achieve risk reductions and relatively low costs if 
the right technology is selected.  Choosing the low cost technology is key to this finding since the 
results indicate heat is substantially more costly than the other technologies at all target levels of 
aggregate invasion risk.  It should be noted that the model results reported here are based on the 
limited information that is currently available about the biosecurity costs of different vessel 
classes, and better information on the fixed and variable costs of ballast control technologies is 
warranted.   
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Table 1.  Effectiveness of Various Ballast Water Management Technologies for Great Lakes Target 
Species 
Control Technology  Target 




Corophium curvispinum have 
been known to naturally occur in 
warm lakes up to 31
o C 
(Rajagopal et al. 1999), although 
this may not be the upper bound 
on survival.  Mortality rates will 
depend on the ballast water 
temperature achieved, the time 
to achieve it, and the duration of 
heating.  Temperatures in excess 
of 40
oC are hard to achieve and 
maintain in colder waters such 
as the Northern Atlantic.  We 
assume 90% efficiency for 
40
oC ( 1 = h x ) and 50% 
efficiency for 35
oC  ( 5 . 0 = h x ) . 
Corophium are marsupial-like amphipods that 
carry their young in pouches until the eggs 
hatch.  There are many related species.  For 
Corophium curvispinum, juveniles are 550mm 
in length (Rajagopal et al. 1999) but possibly 
narrow enough to fit through mesh.  Juveniles 
are up to 1.8 mm and adults average 3.75 mm 
(Rajagopal et al. 1999).  Rigby and Taylor 
(2001) report removal efficiency of 50 mm to 
25 mm filters to be from 80% for small 
rotifers (rotifers usually range in length from 
1mm to 250 mm) and 95% for bivalve 
vetigers.  Given the size of juveniles, we 
assume 60% efficiency for the 50mm filter 
( 5 . 0 = f x ) and 95% for 25mm filter ( 1 = f x ). 
Mysids 
Not generally 
effective at killing 
organisms (Rigby 




organisms from the 
tanks as the 
exchange occurs.  
We assume 
efficiency equals 
the proportion of 
exchange that 
occurs. 
The species  Paramysis 
lacustris have been known to 
survive in situ in temperatures 
up to 28
o C (Baychorov 1980), 
although this may not be the 
upper bound for survival.  We 
assume 95% efficiency for 
40
oC ( 1 = h x ) and 60% 
efficiency for 35
oC  ( 5 . 0 = h x ) . 
Mysids are marsupial-like shrimp that carry 
their young in pouches until the juvenile stage.  
There are many related species.  For the 
species  Paramysis lacustris, adult females 
range in size from 10-14mm (Baychorov 
1980).  Sizes of newly released juveniles were 
not reported, but for the related species 
Neomysis Americana this size averaged 710 
mm (Pezzack and Corey 1979).  Given that 
mysids are generally larger than  corophium 
and that egg deposition is not a concern for 
mysids, we use slightly larger removal 
efficiencies than for  corophium: 80% for 
5 . 0 = f x  and 98% for  1 = f x .    30
Clupeonell
a caspia.   
  The species  clupeonella 
cultriventris caspia naturally 
occurs in temperatures up to 26
o 
C (Aseinova 2003), although 
this may not be the upper bound 
for survival.  We assume 99% 
efficiency for 40
oC ( 1 = h x ) and 
90% efficiency for 35
oC  
( 5 . 0 = h x ) .   
For clupeonella cultriventris caspia, eggs are 
1mm, larvae are 1.3-1.8 mm, and fingerlings 
are 50-55mm.  Adults average 7.8 cm – much 
too large to fit through any filter.  However, 
population structures are weighted heavily by 
newer recruits (Aseinova 2003).  Sizes of 
these younger fish are similar to rotifers and 
small copepods.  We adopt Ribgy and Taylor’s 
(2001) reported removal efficiencies for 
copepods: assume 95% effectiveness for a 
100mm filter ( 1 . 0 = f x ) and 99% 
effectiveness for the 25mm filter ( 1 = f x ).   
 
Table 2.  Costs of Various Ballast Water Management Technologies 
Control Technology 
Ballast Exchange  
(with  75 . 0 = b x ) 
Heating 
(with  1 = h x ) 
Filtration 


































12,000  2.814  2.238  2.684  0.432  0.18  19.05 
60,000  2.244  0.54  3.355  0.54  0.48  6.564   31
Table 3.  Simulation results 
Proportion of Total 
Costs in:  




Filtering  Corophium 
spp. 









Base Case (no 
biosecurity) 
0      0.28  0.28  0.28  ---- 
Case I: 
s s " £ F     1 . 0  
             
  Least Cost  4.72  0.37  0.63  0.10  .10  0.04  1.73 
  Trading  6.11  0.21  0.79  0.10  0.08  .022  1.25 
  Uniform filtering 
requirement 
7.81  0  1.0  0.10  0.05  0.008  0.82 
  Uniform heat 
requirement 
42.57  0  0  0.10  0.08  0.02  0.82 
  Uniform ballast 
exchange 
requirement 
7.64  1.0  0  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.82 
Case II: 
s s " £ F     05 . 0  
             
  Least Cost  6.18  0.17  0.83  0.05  0.05  0.02  1.99 
  Trading  7.45  0.20  0.80  0.05  0.03  0.008  1.51 
  Uniform filtering 
requirement 
7.99  0  1.0  0.05  0.02  0.005  0.82 
  Uniform heat 
requirement 
54.96  0  0  0.05  0.03  0.007  0.82 
  Uniform ballast 
exchange 
requirement 
10.37  1.0  0  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.82 
Case III: 
s s " £ F     01 . 0  
             
  Least Cost  7.54  0.14  0.86  0.01  0.01  0.006  2.87 
  Trading  8.00  0.20  0.80  0.01  0.005  0.003  2.18 
  Uniform filtering 
requirement 
8.13  0  1.0  0.01  0.004  0.003  0.82 
  Uniform heat 
requirement 
64.63  0  0  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.82 
  Uniform ballast 
exchange 
requirement 
12.65  1.0  0  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.82 
a
This is measured by the coefficient of variation in  is q  across vessels, where s is the species for which the 
probabilistic constraint binds. 
 
 